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Redistributive grants schemes, such as fiscal equalization, are a common characteristic of 
local public finance in several countries. However, large and small jurisdictions are treated 
differently by the respective fiscal equalization schemes that often tend to favour larger 
jurisdictions. This paper provides a theoretical analysis showing that efficiency considerations 
might justify a preferential treatment of large jurisdictions. More specifically, we show that an 
efficient grant scheme would enable large jurisdictions such as cities to provide more public 
services. Under some conditions, the resulting budget of cities will exceed that of small towns 
in per-capita terms. Moreover, in a setting with local capital taxation we find that an efficient 
equalization scheme would also allow cities to retain a larger share of own funds. 
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Facing diculties in raising own funds because of mobility and intergovernmental competi-
tion local governments in many countries engage in revenue sharing. A common approach
to revenue sharing, referred to as scal equalization, is to set up a redistributive system
of scal transfers ensuring that revenues after scal redistribution are equalized across ju-
risdictions. While the details vary, scal equalization usually consists of a combination of
unconditional grants allocated to the jurisdictions and some explicit or implicit transfer
obligations since jurisdictions with higher tax revenues receive less equalization grants or
have to pay higher contributions to fund the equalization scheme.
Fiscal equalization often entails a quite signicant redistribution of funds and the associated
distortions and incentive eects call for an appropriate design of equalization schemes. A
fundamental problem in this regard is related to the spatial structure of the economy. In
general, as is emphasized in a large urban economics literature, local jurisdictions strongly
and systematically dier in size and productivity. The most striking characteristic is that
they typically show a rather skewed distribution in terms of population size and density.
This raises the question of whether scal equalization should aim at equalizing per-capita
revenues between small places, towns, and cities.
The local public nance literature (e.g., Wildasin, 1986) suggests that dierences in pop-
ulation size have important implications for the cost of providing public services. For
instance, since public services usually display some degree of non-rivalry the per-capita
cost of providing public services declines with population size. Thus, cities might be able
to provide the same level of public services at lower costs and, therefore, might need less
funds than small towns. Moreover, as emphasized in the tax competition literature, asym-
metries in the size of jurisdictions might give rise to dierences in the marginal cost of
raising public funds (e.g., Bucovetsky, 1991, and Wilson, 1991). Accordingly, due to their
larger share in the market for mobile factors, cities might face less elastic tax bases and,
1hence, would be willing to provide more public services even without grants. These two
arguments seem to suggest that an equalization system should provide less funds to cities
as compared to small towns, at least on a per-capita basis.
In practice, scal equalization systems in countries such as Austria, Germany, and Spain do
treat large and small municipalities dierently. Yet, the grant schemes in these countries
distribute funds on the basis of population numbers that are inated for larger munici-
palities and cities, implying a favorable treatment of these jurisdictions.1 To provide an
example, Figure 1 illustrates the favorable treatment of larger municipalities in the case
of North Rhine-Westfalia, the largest German state, which runs a strongly redistributive
equalization system.2 The solid line depicts scal need in per-capita terms, which is, basi-
cally, the granted per-capita level of spending as dened in the Municipal Finance Law.3
Accordingly, the scal need of larger cities with more than about 600,000 residents is al-
most 60% higher in per-capita terms than that of municipalities below 25,000 inhabitants.
The dots in the gure represent the actual budget size. As they are distributed around
the curve of scal need we see that the equalization system is quite eective in ensuring
that cities do have more public funds at their disposal than small towns even in per-capita
1In these countries the distribution of funds is based on ctitious or weighted rather than actual
population numbers. Formally, scal need fni is dened as
fni = z ni wi;
where z is the basic gure of scal need per capita, ni is the number of inhabitants, and wi is a weight or
factor that is unity for small municipalities but larger than unity for cities depending on population size.
For instance, in Austria the weight is unity if the population is below 10,000 inhabitants and is increasing
with population size up to a gure of 21
3 for municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants. In Spain, the
weight is unity for the calculation of scal need of jurisdictions with less than 5,000 inhabitants, the weight
of cities with more than 500,000 is 1.85. In Germany, dierent rules apply across states. For example, the
largest state, North Rhine-Westfalia, displays weights that vary between unity for municipalities below
25,000 inhabitants and a gure of 1.57 for cities with more than 634.000 inhabitants.
2The strong degree of scal redistribution is documented by the fact that the equalization grants
compensate for 90% of the dierence between scal need (see below) and scal capacity. See Buettner and
Holm-Hadulla (2008) for more details.
3Cf. \Gemeindenanzierungsgesetz des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen 2007."
2Figure 1: Municipal Budget and \Fiscal Need" in the largest German State
Euro per-capita gures. Solid line depicts the scal need per capita according to the Municipal Finance
Law 2007 of North Rhine-Westfalia. Dots represent the actual revenues in per capita terms after scal
redistribution for the 396 municipalities in this year.
3terms.
The traditional justication for the special treatment of large jurisdictions in the German
case goes back to Popitz (1932) who observed that public spending in per-capita terms rose
with population size among Prussian municipalities. This nding is paralleled also in the
US case, where Schmandt and Stephens (1963) and Shapiro (1963) note that local expen-
ditures plotted against population size display a marked U-shaped pattern. Accordingly,
average per-capita expenditures of local governments show a minimum in counties with a
population size of 20,000-50,000 residents, and per-capita expenditures are strongly increas-
ing with population size in counties with more residents. While the empirical observation
of higher per-capita expenditures of cities has motivated the design of scal equalization
schemes in Germany and other countries, the apparent inconsistency of heavily redistribu-
tive equalization mechanisms that, however, systematically favor cities has triggered much
critical discussion in Germany, both in the political sphere and among economists.4
In the local public nance literature, however, the treatment of cities in systems of scal
equalization has been rarely discussed. Contributions that are touching this issue do not
endorse the preferential treatment of cities: Fenge and Meier (2002) show that subsidizing
higher cost of public service provision in cities would induce excess agglomeration, and,
hence, result in welfare losses. Sol e-Oll e and Bosch (2005) provide an empirical analysis
showing that the per-capita cost of public service provision of large municipalities in Spain
is lower than assumed by the scal equalization system.
The contribution of this paper is to reconsider the justication for a special treatment of
cities in a system of scal equalization, explicitly taking into account the dierent condi-
tions for public service provision in large as compared to small jurisdictions. These include
cost dierences due to the non-rivalry in the consumption of public services as well as
dierences in the marginal cost of raising own public funds. In a rst step, we analyze
4E.g., Boes (1970), Kuhn (1983), Peekoven (1987), Homburg (1994), Zimmermann (2001), Kitterer
and Plachta (2008).
4the role of size dierences for the supply of public services in a setting with ecient tax
instruments. While in most countries local governments do not have access to such tax
instruments, the ecient case serves as a useful benchmark in a discussion of the allocation
of funds across municipalities. In a second step, we focus on the role of scal equalization
in a setting with inecient tax instruments. Here the analysis builds on the literature
about ecient equalization which emphasizes that scal equalization grants might have
important eects on tax eort (e.g., Dahlby and Wilson, 1994, Koethenbuerger, 2002,
Bucovetsky and Smart, 2006, Buettner, 2006).
Taking account of dierences in productivity as the underlying force driving interregional
size dierences our results support a preferential treatment of larger jurisdictions with
regard to both the lump-sum and the taxing capacity-dependent component of a typical
equalization scheme. In other words, while we note that cities have a cost advantage in
the provision of public services and are facing lower cost of raising own funds, we nd that
an ecient equalization system that takes account of the spatial structure of the economy
would enable cities to provide more public services and to retain a larger share of own
funds. Under some conditions, this would even imply that the budget of cities after scal
redistribution exceeds that of small towns in per-capita terms.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the implications of size
dierences for an ecient allocation with public and private goods. Section 3 is concerned
with the role of equalization transfers in a setting with a distortive capital tax. Section 4
provides our conclusions.
2 City Size and Public Service Provision
Consider an economy with N jurisdictions, i = 1;2;:::;N. Jurisdiction i hosts ni house-
holds each inelastically supplying one unit of labor. Firms are situated in a central business
5district and produce a uniform good using labor and capital according to a linear homoge-
neous production function Fi(ni;Ki): Given perfect capital mobility, the marginal product
of capital is equal to a uniform rate of return
FiK(ni;Ki) = :
Besides labor income resident households receive income from savings si at the common
rate of return . They derive utility from the consumption of a private good (xi), of housing
space (qi), and of public goods or services zi, formally
ui = v(xi;zi;qi):
To keep the analysis simple let us assume that each household consumes the same amount
of housing qi = 1 such that the utility function simplies to
ui = u(xi;zi) = v(xi;zi;1):
Each jurisdiction hosts an urban area that serves as center of production and is the place
of residence for the mobile population. Consider the case of a monocentric city (see Fujita,
1989, for a discussion). A household located at the urban fringe, which is in distance b to
the city center, would face cost of housing comprising commuting cost of kb and direct cost
of housing corresponding to the price of land. At the urban fringe the latter corresponds
to the opportunity cost of land !. Due to household mobility, dierences in the direct
cost of housing within the city reect dierences in commuting cost. Thus, the (total) cost
of housing, i.e. direct cost of housing plus commuting cost, are constant across the city.
However, the cost of housing varies across cities if the population size diers. With all
households commuting to the central business district we have the following equilibrium





where T () captures the available housing space at distance  from the city center.5 Hence,
the distance from the urban fringe to the city center is an increasing function of the total
population size bi = b(ni). As a consequence, the cost of housing in the city amounts to
hi  h(ni) = ! + kb(ni)
and is increasing in population size.
2.1 Ecient Provision of Local Public Services
Following Wildasin (1986) the public goods or services are provided at cost C (ni;zi) which
is increasing in the quantity provided as well as in population size. With regard to nancing
the provision of the local public services, let us start with the assumption that there is a
fully ecient set of tax instruments. Hence, we insert the cost of public service provision
directly into the households' budget constraint
niFin + sini   (xi + h(ni))ni   C (ni;zi) = 0;
where  is the common return to savings. We assume that the local jurisdiction maximizes
the utility of a representative household under this constraint, formally
Li = u(xi;zi) + i [niFin + sini   (xi + h(ni))ni   C (ni;zi)]:
5In the simple case of a circular city we have T () = 2.
7The optimality conditions are
@Li
@xi
= uix   ini = 0
@Li
@zi
= uiz   iCiz = 0:





where the marginal cost of public funds are unity. Only an increase in the level of public
service provision itself is associated with extra cost.
However, this policy is not necessarily ecient. As noted by Wildasin (1986), from the
viewpoint of a central planner an ecient policy would maximize the following Lagrangian
L
















Note that we include an equal utility constraint that might reect the central planner's
preference for equity. An alternative interpretation is that the planner acknowledges that
only equal levels of utility are consistent with a spatial equilibrium. While the rst-order
conditions (FOC) with respect to public and private consumption are the same as above,
a further condition characterizes the optimal allocation of labor.
@Lcp
@ni
= (Fin   xi   hi   hinni   Cin)   ' = 0:
Because this eciency condition holds for all jurisdictions, it implies that a reallocation of
8labor cannot increase welfare
Fin   xi   hi   hinni   Cin = Fjn   xj   hj   hjnnj   Cjn;
and is, therefore, referred to as the locational eciency condition (Wildasin, 1986).6
2.2 Size Dierences
Suppose that total factor productivity is subject to region-specic productivity dierences,
and let us introduce a productivity parameter i that shifts total factor productivity ac-
cording to Fi (ni;Ki) = i ~ F (ni;Ki). If i > j, region i has a higher productivity such that
Fin > Fjn at the same level of population. As a consequence, the population will be higher
(ni > nj). To see why, consider the locational eciency condition. If, ni = nj, housing
cost and the cost of public service provision are unchanged. Hence, either private or public
consumption or both would have to be higher in region i. With more consumption of xi
and/or zi utility would be higher in i such that the equal-utility constraint is violated.
With equal utility, however, the locational eciency condition would be disturbed and the
central planner would need to reallocate labor to the more productive region. The addi-
tional labor supply would result in a decline in marginal productivity and in higher cost
of housing until the locational eciency is restored. Hence, the population size in region i
would have to be larger and we can state the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (Size of Jurisdictions)
If residents of all jurisdictions enjoy the same level of utility, jurisdictions with higher
productivity have a larger population.
6An important issue in local public economics concerns the set of tax instruments that would ensure
that a decentralized equilibrium will actually meet the locational eciency condition. If a head tax is set
equal to the marginal crowding cost in = Cin+hinni the locational eciency condition is fullled. At the
same time, however, another tax instrument is needed to balance the local government's budget constraint
(see Wildasin, 1986, for a discussion).
9Given some degree of non-rivalry in the consumption of public goods, the size of the
jurisdiction aects the cost of public good provision. Since, if consumption of public
services is not completely rival,
Ciz
ni is declining with the jurisdiction's population. From
the Samuelson condition we know that, as a consequence, the relation between public and
private consumption will be higher in the larger jurisdiction. Moreover, with the same
level of utility in all jurisdictions, xi would be smaller in order to compensate for higher zi.
Thus, building on the inverse relationship between the per-capita marginal cost of public
good provision and the population size we can derive the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Cost-Advantage of Cities)
If public services show some degree of non-rivalry in consumption, an ecient allocation
will enable larger jurisdictions to provide more public services.
A formal proof is given in the appendix.
The consequences of productivity dierences and of the associated size dierences are
illustrated in Figure 2. At a given population size, a productivity increase would shift
the budget constraint upwards and to the right (see arrow \a") such that at given zi each
household could consume more of the private good.
However, in order to restore a situation with the same level of utility everywhere, the
population would have to be larger. To see this note that a population increase would
cause a decline in the marginal product of labor and result in larger housing cost. As a
consequence, the budget constraint would shift back down (see arrow \b"). Moreover, if
we assume some degree of non-rivalry in public consumption, the marginal per-capita cost
Ciz
ni would decline with increasing population size. With a larger population, therefore,
the budget line becomes atter. Provided the jurisdiction is small relative to the country
the utility level in the economy is unaected by the productivity shock and the associated
local government's decisions. Hence, the ecient population size is reached if tangency is
obtained with respect to the initial indierence curve.
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11While our analysis shows that under some relatively weak assumptions the more productive
region will provide a higher level of public services it is not obvious that public spending
is larger in per capita terms. If zi would stay constant, per-capita cost
Ci
ni would decline.
However, zi is increasing and, hence, the per capita cost of public good provision might
rise. If zi increases strongly, the latter eect would dominate and the budget might actually
be larger even in per-capita terms. In fact, the eect on the budget can be characterized
in terms of the Hicksian price elasticity of demand. If demand for the public goods or
services responds rather strongly to a marginal cost-reduction, the per-capita budget will
be higher in the larger jurisdiction.
Proposition 2 (Budget-Size of Cities)
If public services show some degree of non-rivalry in consumption, and if the Hicksian
demand for public services is suciently elastic, in an ecient allocation the budget of
jurisdictions with larger population size is larger in per-capita terms relative to jurisdictions
with less population.
For a formal proof, see Appendix 5.2.
This argument of demand eects might be reinforced in the presence of heterogeneity
between households. Consider a case, where two types of households exist, which dier in
their preferences for public services. If larger jurisdictions have a cost advantage in public
service provision, Tiebout sorting would actually result in a concentration of high public
service demand in the city.
The cost advantage of cities has also been noted by Oates (1989) who argues that it
can explain why the range of government services provided in a large city is greater. A
particularly important issue in this regard is the substitutability between private and public
goods. If complete substitution is possible, a jurisdiction may decide not to provide certain
types of public services if the costs are particularly high.
12Proposition 3 (Substitution and City Size)
If public services show some degree of non-rivalry in consumption, and if the utility function
allows for complete substitution, small jurisdictions are more likely to choose not to provide
public services, in particular, if there are indivisibilities in the provision of these services.
While a formal proof is given in the appendix, the intuition is illustrated by Figure 3. In
the upper panel we depict a situtation where complete substitution is possible. With lower
population size the budget line becomes steeper, and, eventually, no interior solution is
obtained. The lower panel shows the case with indivisibilities in the provision of public
services according to a cost function
C (ni;zi) = (c0 + c1zi)n

i ; for zi > 0; and C (ni;zi = 0) = 0:
With this cost function the feasible budget constraint becomes non-convex: it has kink at
a level of zi = 0. As a consequence, at a certain threshold level of population size, the
local jurisdiction may become indierent between providing public services at a level of ~ zi
or not providing public services at all. Smaller jurisdictions would then shut down public
service provision altogether.
It might seem to be a rather strong assumption that the indierence curves cut the vertical
axis as this implies that public services can be substituted entirely by the private good.
However, note that a point at the vertical axis only implies that the own provision of public
services is zero. In many cases residents of i could still benet from the provision of public
services provided by a neighboring jurisdiction. While a thorough discussion of benet
spillovers in the context of size dierences is beyond the scope of this paper, we may note
that the cost advantage of cities in the provision of public services might further contribute
to a larger budget in metropolitan areas where households consume public services from
dierent locations. Given those benet spillovers the marginal benet from public services
rises. This suggests that the budget of a large jurisdiction that exerts important spillovers
might be larger, provided a mechanism exists that ensures that the willingness to pay for
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14public services in adjacent jurisdictions is resulting in an expansion of public services.
3 City Size and Tax Competition
The previous section has focused on city-size dierences in a setting with an ecient set of
tax instruments. This ecient case serves as a useful benchmark for the allocation of scal
equalization grants across local jurisdictions and may justify why the conceded budget in
per-capita terms, i.e. the scal need, is higher in larger jurisdictions and cities. However,
scal equalization aects the nances of jurisdictions not only by allocating grants that
allow jurisdictions to extend their supply of public services. An important characteristic of
scal equalization is that the grants are tied to the taxing capacity. In fact, in the presence
of scal equalization jurisdictions with higher taxing capacity receive less equalization
grants or have to pay higher contributions to fund the equalization scheme. As has been
emphasized in the literature on tax competition and scal equalization, these implicit or
explicit transfer obligations have important implications in a setting with inecient tax
instruments. Concerned with ineciencies from capital tax competition Wildasin (1989)
discusses Pigouvian subsidies as a means to raise tax eort. Dahlby and Wilson (1994)
analyze the role of scal equalization grants tied to taxing capacity in changing the tax
eort of local jurisdictions. Smart (1998) shows that scal equalization grants provide
incentives to raise distortionary taxes. Koethenbuerger (2002) notes that these grants could
actually replicate the Pigouvian solution to tax-competition ineciencies. Bucovetsky and
Smart (2006) determine the key elements of an ecient scal equalization system in a
setting with capital tax competition and show that the optimal degree of redistribution is
inversely related to the tax-rate elasticity of capital supply. Against this background, this
section considers whether large and small jurisdictions should be treated dierently also
with regard to the incentives provided by the taxing capacity-dependent component of an
15equalization scheme.7
3.1 Tax Competition without Equalization
We extend the above analysis by assuming that on the revenue side the government is
constrained to two sources of funds: a capital tax and unconditional grants.8 This setting
allows us to specify the government budget constraint as
iKKi + Gi = C (ni;zi):
Although the private budget constraint does not contain taxes
xini + h(ni)ni = Finni + sini;
we have to take into account that local taxation of capital will aect household income,
indirectly. This follows since the tax rate iK raises the user cost of capital i and drives a
wedge between the marginal product of capital and the uniform rate of return on capital
FiK(ni;Ki) = i   + iK: (1)
In this setting, the optimal policy of a local government maximizes the Lagrangian
L
loc
i = u(xi;zi) + i [iKKi + Gi   C (ni;zi)]
+i [niFin + sini   nixi   h(ni)ni]:
7In the political debate about the municipal scal equalization system in Germany not only scal need
is discussed controversially (see Introduction), but also the denition of scal capacity. Representatives of
smaller municipalities argue, for instance, that the denition of the taxing capacity by applying average
tax rates on the local tax base would discriminate against smaller jurisdictions, which usually set lower
tax rates due to tax competition (e.g., Busse, 2004).
8Note that this setting is restrictive in that it can not be ensured that locational eciency obtains in
general. However, the following discussion focuses on the distortive eects of capital taxation.








= uiz   iCiz = 0:









i denotes the marginal cost of public funds.
Of course, the marginal cost of public funds is determined by the capital tax rate which is
the government's instrument for transferring private into public funds. We can derive this




















What is required here, is a balance between the shadow value of the additional revenue
generated by a tax increase and the shadow value of its adverse impact on private income.
If the capital account is balanced sini = Ki, we can show that the adverse impact of the
tax increase on income is simply proportional to the tax base,9 and we can rewrite the























Inserting this expression into the FOC, taking account of sini = Ki, and rearranging yields Equation (2).









While the numerator states the loss in private consumption resulting from a tax increase
due to the incidence of the capital tax, the denominator depicts the additional public funds
associated with a tax increase. Accordingly, the larger the adverse eect of a tax increase
on the local tax base the smaller is the denominator and the larger is the marginal cost of
public funds.
As has been noted by Wildasin (1989), under conditions of interjurisdictional capital mo-
bility the marginal cost of public funds faced by the individual jurisdictions is larger than
in a cooperative setting since at least a part of the adverse tax-base eect reects an in-
crease in the tax base of other jurisdictions. Hence, Equation (2) may be referred to as the
perceived marginal cost of public funds in the non-cooperative case. Consider the optimal
policy in a fully cooperative situation by invoking a federal planner who determines the
tax policy in one jurisdiction under the condition that all jurisdictions obtain the same
level of utility. This federal planner's decision problem is given by10
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10While we assume that the federal planner is able to redistribute public funds across jurisdictions we
follow Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) and assume that the federal planner cannot redistribute private funds.
In this regard the federal planner diers from the central planner that was used in the previous section.
However, this dierence reects our current focus on local tax policy.














In comparison with expression (2), the marginal cost is lower as the denominator now
includes the positive scal externality of a tax increase.
3.2 Ecient Equalization
As Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) as well as Koethenbuerger (2002) suggest, an ecient
equalization scheme would eliminate the gap between the perceived cost of funds in the
non-cooperative case (2) and the social cost of funds (3). In our case, what is needed is
simply a redistributive scheme of grants such that
Gi = Zi   #iKi;
where Gi denotes grants allotted to jurisdiction i. Two components can be distinguished:
Zi is a lump-sum component representing the amount of virtual grants received by the
jurisdiction if its tax base were actually zero. #iKi is the scal capacity-dependent com-
ponent. The marginal contribution rate #i denes the extent to which an increase in the






i.e. the fraction of own tax revenues implicitly taken away by the equalization system.




i = u(xi;zi) + i [(iK   #i)Ki + Zi   C (ni;zi)]
+i [niFin + sini   nixi   nih(ni)]:















As above, we make use of niFinK =  KiFiKK and derive the marginal cost of public funds









Following Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) the ecient equalization scheme consists of an
appropriate choice of #1;#2;:::#i;:::#M and Z1;Z2;:::Zi;:::ZM such that the perceived cost
of public funds is equal to the social cost of public funds and the utility level in each
jurisdiction is the same. Thus, the ecient choice of #i ensures that marginal cost of
raising public funds as dened by Equations (3) and (4) coincide. Rearranging terms,
we nd that the ecient choice of the marginal contribution rate corresponds with the
additional tax revenue that an increase in iK induces in all other jurisdictions relative to











The numerator captures the scal externality, the denominator captures the direct impact
on the own budget.
Consider the case where the overall capital supply is increasing in the net-rate of return 
20with elasticity . As is shown in the Appendix 5.5, if the elasticity of capital demand is
equal across jurisdictions i;j =  and if tax rates are identical iK = K; the condition
for the optimal contribution rate can be simplied. Expressed relative to the local tax rate















At rst sight the simplifying assumptions might seem rather restrictive. However, note
that there are no dierences in preferences and that the central planner ensures that size
dierences do not aect the marginal cost of public funds across jurisdictions. Thus,
identical tax rates are a natural outcome of this model. Moreover, a constant elasticity of
capital demand is obtained for instance with a simple Cobb-Douglas production function,
and, hence, does not seem overly restrictive.
As Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) note in a slightly dierent setting, the optimal rate of
equalization declines with the elasticity of capital supply . However, Equation (6) has
another interesting implication regarding the optimal rate of equalization under conditions
of size dierences of the jurisdictions:
Proposition 4 (Ecient Redistribution and Size Dierences)
With local taxation of mobile capital and a positive elasticity of the total capital supply,
and if the elasticity of capital demand is similar across jurisdictions, an ecient scal
equalization scheme displays a lower rate of equalization for large jurisdictions and a higher
rate for small jurisdictions.
To see this, consider the denominator in (6). If jurisdiction i is small, K
K Ki which is the
inverse of the capital share of other jurisdictions, is close to unity. But, if jurisdiction
i is large this term increases as the capital share of other jurisdictions declines. As a
consequence, the denominator increases and the rate of equalization req?
i declines.
21The intuition for this result is simply that the eect of capital taxation on the tax base of
a jurisdiction that employs a larger share of total capital is to a larger extent determined
by the aggregate capital supply elasticity and to a lesser extent related to interjurisdic-
tional mobility. Thus, there is less need to provide an incentive to raise tax eort in larger
jurisdictions. This result is related to the theory of asymmetric tax competition (Bucov-
etsky, 1991, and Wilson, 1991), where it is shown that smaller jurisdictions will act more
competitively and set lower tax rates.
4 Conclusions
This paper has addressed the question of how a system of scal equalization should deal
with size dierences between jurisdictions from an eciency perspective. While this issue
has not received much attention in the previous literature, existing equalization systems
in several countries feature special provisions that favor cities. This is most strikingly il-
lustrated by the practice of municipal scal equalization in Austria, Germany, and Spain
where funds are distributed based on population numbers that are inated for larger mu-
nicipalities and cities. Using the example of the largest German state we illustrate that
the preferential treatment has important consequences: despite a substantial degree of
redistribution, cities enjoy much larger budgets than small municipalities in per-capita
terms.
The contribution of this paper is to show that a preferential treatment of cities in systems
of scal equalization might be justied by eciency considerations. For this purpose we
set up a model where mobile residents consume a private good, and housing, as well as
public goods or services, and where jurisdictions dier in productivity. These productivity
dierences give rise to size dierences in terms of population which in turn result in a cost
advantage in public service provision for larger jurisdictions if there is some degree of non-
rivalry in the consumption of public services. This implies that an ecient distribution of
22funds would allow cities to expand public relative to private consumption. If the demand
for public services is elastic or if public services can be substituted completely by the private
good, the resulting budget would be higher in larger jurisdictions even in per-capita terms.
This supports the practice of local scal equalization in several countries where cities are
assumed to have a larger scal need per-capita than small towns.
In a setting with inecient tax instruments, we show that additional considerations justify
a dierent treatment of cities in scal equalization also with regard to the degree of scal
redistribution. Following Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) we assume that local governments
use a capital tax and equalization grants in order to nance the provision of local public
services. The capital tax is assumed to be distortive even if revenue-sharing induces a tax
policy that is consistent with a fully co-operative solution. In this setting, we show that
an ecient scal equalization system would tend to treat jurisdictions dierently also with
regard to the rate of equalization: grants would be less responsive to the taxing capacity
in jurisdictions that are hosting a relatively large share of the total tax base.
Our analysis opens up a new perspective on the special treatment of cities in systems of
local scal equalization. While there is a general presumption that the favorable treatment
of cities entails a potentially inecient subsidy, our results suggest that an assessment of the
special treatment of cities might come to a dierent conclusion if specic supply conditions
for public services and ineciencies from tax competition are taken into account. Thus,
while cities have a cost advantage in the provision of public services and are facing lower
cost of raising own funds, an ecient equalization system might actually enable cities to
run larger budgets in per-capita terms and to retain a larger share of own funds than small
towns.
235 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider two jurisdictions i and j which dier in population size such that ni > nj but
which are oering the same amount of public and private goods (zi = zj and xi = xj).




























where the term in brackets is the determinant of the Hessian bordered with the rst order
partial derivatives which is negative for a strictly quasi-concave utility function. Hence,
in a setting with dierent population size it is not ecient to provide the same amount of
public and private goods. Instead, the change in MRSi implies that zi > zj and, at the
given level of utility, xi < xj.
245.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Let pi 
Ciz
ni denote the per-capita marginal cost of public goods or services zi. Then
z?
i = zH(pi;u) is the Hicksian demand for public services as a function of the marginal
cost pi and the utility level in the economy. To prove Proposition 2 we need to show that,
depending on the elasticity of demand, the per-capita cost of providing public services at
a level consistent with the given level of utility may be increasing in the population size.

















where pin gives the partial eect of the population size on the marginal per-capita cost of
public good provision. If zi is not completely rival in consumption, pin is negative. Making















where  is the Hicksian elasticity of demand. Now let   Cin
ni
Ci be the elasticity of the
cost of public service provision with respect to the population size { sometimes referred to













pi is the elasticity of the per-capita marginal cost of public good provision with
regard to population size. Obviously, the condition is fullled for higher levels of  as
25stated in the above proposition.
If Ciz is constant in zi but increasing in ni, pin
ni






where the right hand-side is simply the ratio of total over variable cost. Thus, if, for
example, the provision of public services does not involve any xed cost, with  > 1 the
budget in per-capita terms should increase with the population size.
5.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose the utility function allows for complete substitution between public and private
consumption. Then, we can determine a lower threshold of population size such that larger
jurisdictions would consume positive amounts of both the private good and the public goods
whereas smaller jurisdictions would only consume the private good. To determine this
threshold level, we note that there is one level of private consumption xi that is consistent
with the common level of utility and zero consumption of public goods
xi : u(xi;zi = 0) = u:
Now we can specify the marginal rate of substitution that is in accordance with the common
level of utility and zero consumption of public goods
 
uz (xi;zi = 0)
ux (xi;zi = 0)
:
If the location-specic productivity eect i declines, the population size of the jurisdic-
tion becomes smaller and eventually goes to zero. At the same time, the marginal cost
of providing the public goods in per-capita terms goes to innity. For small jurisdictions,
therefore, full specialization occurs. The threshold level of population size where full spe-
26cialization occurs is obtained by setting  equal to the marginal cost of providing the public
goods at zi = 0:
n :  =
Cz (n;zi = 0)
n
:
In the presence of indivisibilities, the threshold level of population size is higher, since
with the non-convex budget set due to the xed cost of public good provision a positive
amount of consumption is characterized by two conditions. The rst is the above Samuelson
condition. The second requirement is that a specialization on private consumption is not
preferred even if this would imply cost savings due to the xed cost of public good provision.
Consider the budget constraint for a cost function with indivisibilities













The last term in brackets on the right-hand side captures the per-capita marginal cost of




that is declining in population size as discussed above. The





to this term, the income available for private consumption at zero provision of the public
















Therefore, if the population size is approaching n from above, where n is implied by  =
Cz(n;zi=0)
n , no interior solution is obtained: fully shutting down public good provision would
allow the jurisdiction to enjoy more private consumption and, thus, yield a higher level
of utility. Of course, this would conict with the equal utility constraint. At lower levels
of private consumption, however, locational eciency would be disturbed such that the
central planner would reallocate population to jurisdiction i. Hence, the population size,
where specialization occurs, will have to be higher than in the absence of indivisibilities.
275.4 Derivation of the Social Marginal Cost of Public Funds
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28Since niFin = Fi(ni;Ki)   KiFiK we know that niFinK =  KiFiKK and we can rewrite


















In order to facilitate the interpretation of this expression we consider the case where all













5.5 Derivation of Equation (6)






































where i is the elasticity of capital demand with regard to the user cost of capital i. This
























where i;j denote the elasticity of capital demand to the user cost of capital i;j. The
rst term in squared brackets captures the strength of the impact on other jurisdictions'
29cost of capital relative to the impact on the own cost of capital. The second term in squared
brackets captures the consequence of a cost of capital increase on other jurisdictions' bud-
gets relative to the eect on the own tax base.
To simplify the eects on the cost of capital we need to consider the capital market. The



























where i is the elasticity of capital demand and  is the elasticity of the overall capital
supply. In a case where the elasticity of capital demand is equal across jurisdictions i;j = 
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